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Transitional Justice in Burma: A Survey of Accountability and National
Reconciliation Mechanisms after Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release

Courtesy of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts in
Cambodia.

by Ari M. Levin*

The first day of closing statements in the trial against the head of one of the Khmer Rouge’s
secret prisons.

B

Introduction

coincided with renewed fighting in Karen State by a brigade of
the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), demonstrating
that the armed struggle continues.5

urma is unquestionably one of the world’s most repressive countries. The military junta, the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), has controlled the country since 1962, stifling political and ethnic opposition. Although
Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD)
won the 1990 national elections in a landslide victory, the SPDC
refused to relinquish power and forced Suu Kyi into house arrest
for 15 of the past 21 years.1 During that time, the military regime
systematically committed gross abuses of human rights and
humanitarian law, including arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial execution, torture, forced labor, human trafficking, and
sexual violence against women.2 Burmese ethnic minorities in
particular, have suffered in their struggle for self-determination.3

The junta strategically waited to release Suu Kyi until after
conducting fraudulent democratic elections on November 7,
2010.6 Consequently, the junta entrenched the military’s Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) within the government structure under the guise of legitimacy. After the junta
drafted the 2008 Constitution without democratic input and
prevented many opposition candidates from participating in the
November elections, the military bloc – the USDP and the military (Tatmadaw) – controls over eighty percent of the seats in
parliament.7 Of the top five politicians in the new system – the
president, two vice presidents, and the speakers of the upper and
lower houses of parliament – four are career army bureaucrats,
including the new president Thein Sein.8

With Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent release on November 13,
2010, however, there is cautious optimism in Burma. The Nobel
Peace Prize laureate symbolizes freedom and democracy, and
her release carries transformative potential. Yet, this moment of
triumph is tempered by the estimated 2,200 political prisoners
in Burma still enduring grave abuses.4 In addition, her release

While this is undoubtedly an exciting time in Burma, democracy and human rights are by no means imminent. Accordingly,
this paper reviews the available transitional justice mechanisms
that could help guide Burma out of the legacy of mass atrocities
and into a peaceful democracy. Although a democratic transition does not seem plausible in the near future, it is important
for local stakeholders to prepare a transitional justice process in
case political space opens – either gradually or suddenly – for
democratic reforms.

* Ari M. Levin is a Congressional Fellow with the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission and former Senior Articles Editor of the Human
Rights Brief. He graduated from American University in 2010 with a J.D.
and a Masters in International Politics.
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Designing a Transitional Justice Process for Burma

The first option is that the UN Security Council could exercise its Chapter VII power to establish an independent tribunal
for Burma. Examples of ad hoc tribunals created under Chapter
VII include the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/R). However, the ad hoc tribunal
model is not well suited for Burma. The ICTY/R are very costly.
Additionally, the formation of an ad hoc tribunal under Chapter
VII necessitates tremendous political will within the Security
Council.

Transitional justice is a “response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights.”9 The concept refers to a
country’s transition out of conflict and into democracy, peace,
and reconciliation. A transitional justice process holistically
integrates many different mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, traditional
justice mechanisms, institutional reform, and memorialization
initiatives.10 To be successful, these processes should be tailored
to appropriately address the particular political, cultural, and
socio-economic context. Best practice involves community ownership in the design process and implementation.
In designing a transitional justice
process for Burma, pro-democracy
and ethnic leaders should seek to
implement retributive and restorative justice mechanisms in consultation with international experts.
Retributive justice mechanisms focus
on accountability for mass abuses
and are necessary to prevent a culture of impunity and to restore the
rule of law. By contrast, restorative
justice mechanisms are intended to
rehabilitate victims of human rights
abuses and reintegrate them back
into their communities. Reparations
programs, truth commissions, and
memorialization efforts are examples
of restorative justice. Retributive and
restorative justice mechanisms work
in tandem and should both be incorporated in a comprehensive Burmese
transitional justice process.

The creation of a hybrid tribunal in Burma is a second
option. Hybrid tribunals combine elements of domestic and
international criminal justice systems. They are often implemented where domestic political will
to prosecute prior abuses exists, but
there is insufficient judicial capacity
or other obstacles to domestic prosecutions.

The Nobel Peace
Prize laureate
symbolizes freedom
and democracy, and
her release carries
transformative
potential

Regionally relevant contemporary
examples of hybrid criminal justice
systems include the Special Panels
for Serious Crimes in East Timor,
and the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).
The experiences of the Special Panels
and the ECCC may be instructive
to Burma. In June 2000, the United
Nations Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET) established
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes,
granting them exclusive jurisdiction
over genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, murder, sexual
offenses, and torture.14 The regulation that established the ECCC called for three Special Panels—
two at the district court level and one appeals court—and
required that two international judges and one East Timorese
judge preside over each panel.15 UNTAET also created the
Department of Prosecution of Serious Crimes, staffed almost
exclusively by international experts and funded by the UN.16

Retributive Justice Mechanisms
Breaking the Culture of Impunity: International
Criminal Prosecutions

The ECCC is an example of a hybrid tribunal with less UN
involvement. After four years of negotiations, the UN and the
government of Cambodia agreed to create the ECCC in June
2003 to prosecute those most responsible for crimes committed
during the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979.17 The ECCC
is rooted in Cambodian domestic law, but its judicial composition includes a mix of Cambodian and foreign judges.18 Like
Burma today, Cambodia lacked judicial independence and had a
culture of impunity.19

Prosecutions for mass crimes promote justice and victims’
rights. Key leaders of the junta should be investigated and prosecuted for their involvement in torture and other international
crimes for which a duty to prosecute exists under international
law.11 However, without an independent judiciary, effective prosecutions are not viable. International involvement in criminal
prosecutions is necessary in order to address crimes committed
in Burma under the junta’s rule because the judiciary in Burma
is controlled by the military regime.12 Any domestic prosecutions are also hampered by the amnesty afforded to SPDC leaders under Article 445 of Burma’s 2008 Constitution.13

The East Timorese and Cambodian case studies suggest
that hybrid tribunals may have some success where the UN
either administers the territory in question or wields substantial
bargaining power with the local government. The UN directly
administered East Timor and assisted efforts to rebuild the East
Timorese judicial system following a vote for independence in
a UN-led referendum.20 In Cambodia, the UN negotiated the
establishment of the ECCC after the collapse of the Khmer
Rouge. Given that the military junta maintains a firm grip on
power in Burma, and that the UN lacks bargaining power with-

Although criminal prosecutions in Burma are not realistic in
the short term, many mechanisms for prosecutions require substantial preparations, and therefore it is worth considering them
now. There are three methods by which international prosecutions of Burmese officials could occur: the establishment of an
ad hoc tribunal under the authority of the UN Security Council,
the establishment of a hybrid tribunal, or the referral of select
high-level cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
22
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Although a democratic transition does not seem
plausible in the near future, it is important for local
stakeholders to prepare a transitional justice process
in case political space opens — either gradually or
suddenly — for democratic reforms.
out China’s support, the time does not appear ripe for a hybrid
judicial solution. A hybrid tribunal may be possible, however, if
political circumstances change and a new Burmese government
assumes power and supports accountability.

The UN has used CoIs to uncover serious violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law. CoIs can be
established directly by the UN Secretary General, as evidenced
by Ban-Ki Moon’s creation of a CoI to address the September
29, 2009 killings and rape in Guinea.29 The General Assembly
and Security Council can also initiate a CoI through resolutions.
For example, the Security Council requested that the Secretary
General establish a CoI on Darfur through Resolution 1564
(2004).30 A CoI into crimes committed in Darfur established
in 2005 likely contributed to the Security Council’s referral of
the situation in Darfur to the ICC for investigation.31 Former
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 2004 declaration that the conflict in Darfur amounted to genocide was one factor leading to
the establishment of the CoI.32

The third retributive justice option is that the Security Council
could refer the situation in Burma to the ICC. Although there
are four ways in which the ICC can hear a case—State Party
referral, non-State Party referral on an ad hoc basis for crimes
committed in that state’s territory, Security Council referral, and
through the prosecutor’s own initiative—Security Council referral would be necessary for Burma. Since Burma is not a party to
the Rome Statute, another state could not refer the matter, and
the ICC prosecutor could not independently exercise his propio
motu powers to investigate the situation.21 Further, while Burma
could theoretically self-refer particular matters to the ICC, the
SPDC is not going to seek accountability for alleged crimes
committed by junta leaders. Security Council referral to the ICC
is thus the only plausible scenario at the present time. This is
problematic, however, because China, a permanent member of
the Security Council, would most likely veto such a proposal due
to its strong economic ties with Burma.22

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) is also empowered
to create a CoI or fact-finding mission. The UN Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict is one such example.33 Given
that Burma appeared before the HRC on January 27, 2011 for
its first ever Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process that
assesses a country’s human rights compliance, the HRC could
seek to implement a CoI for Burma to better ascertain the situation on the ground.

Commission of Inquiry

In 1997, the International Labor Organization (ILO) formed
a commission to investigate forced labor in Burma.34 Although
the SPDC refused to participate in hearings and prohibited the
commission from formally visiting Burma to conduct research,
the ILO commission’s report was one of the factors that led to
the junta’s 1999 amendments of two British colonial labor laws
legalizing forced labor.35 The amended laws now prohibit forced
labor, in conformity with section 374 of the Burmese penal
code.36 A CoI on war crimes and crimes against humanity could
similarly generate pressure on the junta to pass legal reforms.

To build support for prosecutions in any of the aforementioned venues, the UN could establish a commission of inquiry
(CoI) to document mass crimes committed by the junta.23 While
the documentation of mass atrocities by a CoI could pave the
way for prosecutions before the ICC or elsewhere, a CoI is a
distinct and independent mechanism.
A review of UN human rights reports since 2002 demonstrates that the UN has characterized crimes committed in
Burma as widespread and systematic.24 In August 2009, fourteen Nobel laureates, including the Dalai Lama and Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, urged the members of the Security Council
to create a CoI for Burma.25 The Special Rapporteur for the
situation of human rights in Burma, Tomás Ojea Quintana, also
recommended such a commission in his most recent report.26
The establishment of a CoI would be an important step toward
justice and accountability in Burma. Unfortunately, however,
very few states have pushed on the international level for the
establishment of a CoI.27 Even the United States, which publicly
endorsed a CoI in August 2010, has failed to actively champion
its establishment.28

Restorative Justice Mechanisms
Burmese Truth-seeking Initiatives
As a complement to accountability mechanisms, truthseeking initiatives in Burma could allow victims to voice their
grievances and share their experiences of abuse and trauma. One
such initiative is a truth and reconciliation commission. A truth
and reconciliation commission is a formal body mandated to
hold proceedings in which victims—and sometimes perpetrators
23
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their grievances with the junta.45 The group received more than
2,500 letters.46 The success of this unofficial truth-seeking
mechanism suggests that similar initiatives could lay the groundwork for dialogue and reconciliation.

in exchange for amnesty—voluntarily testify. An official report
is generally published with a record of the testimony.
The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth, and
Reconciliation (CAVR, in Portuguese) is an instructive regional
model that involved substantial community participation. The
CAVR promoted reconciliation at the grassroots level through
community hearings in which victims and perpetrators could
collaborate and formulate just solutions. This victim-offender
mediation was coupled with a documentation effort to uncover
the truth about past abuses through victim statements and a
traditional justice philosophy unique to East Timor known as
alcohimento, which promotes accepting the human dignity of
one another and offering victims support. Under this guiding
spirit, victims and perpetrators of minor offenses in East Timor
were provided the opportunity to reconcile their grievances and
reintegrate into the community.37

In addition to reaching out to minority groups and encouraging their participation in a truth commission, bridging interethnic divisions between disparate minority groups is critical.
Dialogue groups could help ethnic minorities recognize their
common victimhood. Independent conflict resolution experts
could facilitate dialogue and train local leaders with the goal of
forging minority community linkages. Columbia University’s
Interethnic Conflict Resolution Program for Burma’s Ethnic
Nationalities provides a useful model for interethnic community
reconciliation. In 2002, the Center for International Conflict
Resolution at Columbia partnered with the National Democratic
Front, a union of eight Burmese minority groups, to create
opportunities for peaceful coexistence among ethnic groups
within Burma.47 The group offered workshops to representatives
from women’s and youth organizations in Chiang Mai and Mae
Sot, Thailand.48 Consultative visits were also conducted with
ethnic political leaders.49

Burmese communities may consider lessons learned from
East Timor in shaping a similar commission in Burma. Victims
who choose to testify before the truth commission may find
catharsis and healing by having a chance to publicly acknowledge how they have suffered and to have the junta acknowledge
their suffering by allowing them the space to share. Similar to
the truth-seeking effort in the CAVR, a truth and reconciliation
commission could record victims’ stories and publish them as
form of historical memory.

Political dialogue between the military, democratic parties, and ethnic groups is also essential.50 Suu Kyi has called
for a second Panglong conference to promote national reconciliation.51 This conference would succeed the 1947 Panglong
Agreement between General Aung San (Suu Kyi’s father) and
representatives from Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic nationalities
and could provide an opening for peace.52 The first conference
sought to unite various ethnic groups under the Union of Burma
seeking independence from Britain.53

Alternative truth-seeking initiatives may also help Burmese
citizens deal with the legacy of past abuses. Documentation
of abuses through location-based engagement is critical as
close to the time of the crimes as possible in order to compile
credible evidence for future reconciliation and accountability.38 The Network for Human Rights Documentation—Burma
(ND-Burma), is a coalition of local Burmese groups whose
members collaborate on human rights training, data collection
and management, and documentation methodology.39 By collecting standardized human rights data using the ND-Burma
model, pro-democracy activists could effectively promote
restorative justice.40

Memorials and museums could also be built in celebration of the ethnic and cultural heritage of the various groups.
Inter-faith community centers could be built to create public
space for social interaction. Bringing minority groups together
in a neutral, welcoming environment could foster social peacebuilding and cultural integration. Along these lines, curriculum
could be introduced in schools to celebrate the ethnic diversity
within Burma and promote tolerance and understanding across
ethnic lines. If the barriers between ethnic minority groups are
removed, these groups could potentially increase their power
within the country to produce meaningful change.

Ethnic Minority Integration Programs
Restorative justice initiatives should focus on ethnic minorities in Burma that the junta has discriminated against and
exploited for many years.41 Human rights reports reveal that
many of the more than 100 ethnic groups in Burma have suffered from abuses committed by the Burman-dominated military regime.42 For example, a recent report documented crimes
against humanity committed against the Rohingyas in Western
Burma.43 The Rohingyas are a Muslim group to whom the
Burmese government refuses to grant citizenship. As a result,
the stateless Rohingya people are vulnerable to forced displacement, human trafficking, and forced labor campaigns in Burma
as well as in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Thailand, where hundreds of thousands have fled since 1962.44

Conclusion
This paper surveys the transitional justice mechanisms
available to Burma in the aftermath of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
release from house arrest. In evaluating the feasibility of these
mechanisms, one must consider the political reality of the current situation. The intransigent military junta has violently suppressed democratic opposition. With the recent sham elections,
the regime is likely to tighten its grip on power rather than make
compromises with minority resistance groups. It is problematic
that the political opposition does not have leverage to influence
the junta’s policies. Those actors that do have leverage, notably
China and ASEAN, have not displayed the political will necessary to institute reforms. Under this political landscape, the
outlook for transitional justice is discouraging.

Localized transitional justice programs may be one way to
unify Burmese citizens and form an inclusive society. For example, in the 2007 “Open Heart Campaign,” the ’88 Generation
Students group, a network led by former political prisoners,
encouraged Burmese citizens throughout the country to express
24
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In addition to documenting crimes for future
accountability, restorative justice initiatives are critical for
healing and reconciliation within Burmese society.
While Burma does not appear ready for a democratic transition at this time, there is an opportunity to address the junta’s
repression. Internal and external actors should leverage Aung
San Suu Kyi’s release to press the junta for democratic reforms.
Even though the most of the available transitional justice mechanisms are not implementable in the short term, stakeholders
could start the process via targeted individual mechanisms.
Specifically, ICC prosecutions for top junta leaders will not
come to fruition at the present time because of staunch resistance from China. As a preliminary step, however, the UN could
successfully create a CoI.

groups between persecuted ethnic groups could help forge a
shared identity and collective bargaining power in negotiating
with the junta for better treatment. Finally, memorials could be
built and educational programs sponsored to celebrate the ethnic
diversity within Burma.
For all of these initiatives, regional and international engagement is paramount. Sanctions, or the threat thereof, by ASEAN
member states with strong economic ties to Burma could
positively impact the SPDC’s behavior. More robust support
for a CoI by the United States could lead to its establishment.
External actors should collaborate with Aung San Suu Kyi
and other democracy activists and ethnic leaders to facilitate
the peace and justice movement. If opposition parties are able
to enter the political sphere and affect government policy, the
mechanisms discussed could ultimately pave the way for a
peaceful transition to a democratic Burma. HRB

In addition to documenting crimes for future accountability,
restorative justice initiatives are critical for healing and reconciliation within Burmese society. A truth and reconciliation commission or other truth-seeking initiatives could provide a forum
for victims to share their trauma and find catharsis. Dialogue
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